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A fter the adoption of the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution by the Congress of the United States in August, 1964,1 there was a substantial 
increase in the American military presence in South Vietnam and consequent 
and parallel increases in the range and extent of belligerent activities. In 
accordance with its customary practice, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross2 (hereinafter referred to as the ICRC) thereupon addressed a letter to the 
several parties to the conflict,3 pointing out that they had all ratified or adhered 
to, and were bound by, the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of 
Victims ofWar.4 The ICRC reminded the parties of their specific obligations 
under the Conventions,5 and requested information as to the measures being 
taken by each of them to conform to the duties devolving upon them. 
Replies were received from all of the parties concerned. The United States 
advised that it "has always abided by the humanitarian principles enunciated in 
the Geneva conventions and will continue to do so." Spe~ifically, it affirmed 
that it was "applying the provisions of the Geneva Conventions [in Vietnam] 
and we expect the other parties to the conflict to do likewise.,,6 The Republic 
of Vietnam (hereinafter referred to as South Vietnam) assured the ICRC that it 
was "fully prepared to respect the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and 
to contribute actively to the efforts of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross to ensure their application.,,7 
The reply received from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (hereinafter 
referred to as North Vietnam) was the usual propaganda tirade which appears 
to be endemic in Communist documents, thus making it rather difficult to isolate 
any truly responsive portions. However, the letter did state that North Vietnam 
would "regard the pilots who have carried out pirate-raids, destroying the 
property and massacring the population of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, as major [war] criminals caught in flagrante delicto and liable for 
judgment in accordance with the laws of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
although captured pilots are well treated."S The National Liberation Front 
(hereinafter referred to as the NLF) , the political arm of the Vietcong, flatly 
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refused to apply the Conventions, stating that it "was not bound by the 
international treaties to which others beside itself subscribed .... [T]he NLF, 
however, affinned that the prisoners it held were humanely treated and that, 
above all, enemy wounded were collected and cared for.,,9 
This article has well-defined limitations in scope. It will be concerned solely 
with some of the instances of maltreatment of prisoners of war which constitute 
violations of several of the more important humanitarian provisions of the 1949 
Geneva Prisoner-of-W ar Convention, or of customary international law , which 
appear to have occurred during the course of the fighting in Vietnam.10 
Unfortunately, the positions taken by North Vietnam and the NLF necessitate 
at least some discussion of the problems created by their attitude toward 
compliance with the humanitarian aspects of the law of war and by the question 
of the applicability of the Convention under the circumstances which exist in 
Vietnam. 
I. Past Communist Practice With Respect to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War 
Inasmuch as the lony list of States which have ratified or adhered to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions1 contains all of the Communist countries, including the 
major sponsors of North Vietnam and the NLF, viz the USSR and the People's 
Republic of China, it is obvious that the refusal of North Vietnam and the NLF 
to consider themselves bound by even the limited humanitarian provisions 
enumerated in Article 3 of the Convention 12 cannot be because these provisions 
are in any manner contrary to the Communist concept of the law of war. 13 The 
only alternative is to assume that they consider that it is in their own self-interest 
not to be under any of the constraints imposed by a requirement to comply with 
these purely humanitarian aspects of the law of war. However, one engaged in 
armed hostilities, even as a rebel in a civil war, cannot thus divest himself of the 
requirement to comply with those portions of the law of war which constitute 
a part of the customary rules of international law recognized by all civilized 
nations-and, as we shall shortly see in more detail, the provisions of Article 3 
of the Convention, for the most part, fall within this category.14 
A. The USSR during World War II 
During World War II, the USSR acknowledged that it was bound by the 
1907 Hague Regulations15 and the 1929 Geneva Wounded-and-Sick 
Convention, 16 and took the position that the provisions of these two agreements 
covered "all the main questions of captivity." 17 Based upon this statement the 
ICRC assumed that there would be, among other things, exchanges of lists of 
prisoners of war and of mail and relief packages, and that its delegates would be 
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pennitted and enabled to enter Russia and to inspect prisoner-of-war camps 
located in that country. This was also the assumption of the enemies of the 
USSR. Despite continuous efforts on the part of the ICRC, however, none of 
these things ever eventuated.1S One author ascribed this negative policy adopted 
by the USSR to the alleged "official Soviet position, that any soldier who fell 
into enemy hands was ipso facto a traitor and deserved no protection from his 
19 govemment. " 
B. North Korea 
During the Korean hostilities the North Korean Government announced that 
its forces were "strictly abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect 
to Prisoners of War,,;20 and in the lengthy dispute during the annistice 
negotiations regarding "forced repatriation" of prisoners of war, the North 
Korean and Chinese Communists relied very heavily on certain articles of the 
1949 Convention.21 Despite this, only two lists of American prisoners of war, 
totalling just 110 names, were ever sent to the Central Tracing Agency of the 
I CRC in Geneva (in August and September 1950, shortly after hostilities began), 
death marches occurred, prisoners of war were inadequately fed, and mail was 
allowed only on an irregular basis (usually to serve some propaganda purpose). 
Repeated efforts, which continued even during the course of the annistice 
negotiations, were unsuccessful in obtaining pennission for the ICRC to send 
a delegate into North Korea to inspect the prisonerof-war camps located there.22 
C. North Vietnam 
Now, in Vietnam, we have a third instance of a Communist regime (North 
Vietnam) which has agreed to be bound by a humanitarian war convention but 
which, when the conditions arise under which the convention is to be applied, 
declines to comply with its provisions. North Vietnam persists in refusing to 
provide the names of persons held as prisoners of war, refusing to pennit 
correspondence between the prisoners of war and their families, and refusing to 
pennit the neutral ICRC delegates to inspect the prisoner-of-war camps so as 
to be able to detennine whether the prisoners of war are, in fact, receiving the 
humane treatment to which they are entitled and which that regime long ago 
committed itself to provide. Similarly, the NLF refuses to consider itselfbound 
in any way, even by the limited provisions of Article 3 of the Convention?3 
It would seem, at this point, to be fairly well established that the Communist 
countries, while ready to become parties to humanitarian war conventions, are 
not ready to comply with their provisions, for they are either not concerned 
about obtaining reciprocal treatment for their captured personnel, or, possibly, 
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they may assume that by their present method they will still obtain humane 
treatment for Communist personnel without any need to reciprocate-which 
is what has actually occurred in both Korea and Vietnam. Unfortunately, the 
result of this procedure can only be that eventually the other side in international 
armed conflicts, and the established government in civil armed conflicts, will 
refuse to apply the Convention until confirmation of the fact that it is being 
applied by the Communist side. 24 Although this procedure certainly would leave 
much to be desired from the immediate humanitarian point of view, it might, 
in the long run, prove to be more humanitarian to the greater number of persons. 
Of course, the argument would undoubtedly be made, in opposition to such a 
procedure, that the obligation to comply with the Convention does not depend 
upon reciprocity, but upon the undertaking made to all the other parties thereto, 
and also that the Convention creates individual rights which may not be 
withdrawn because of the failure of one side to comply.25 While this may well 
be true, it is unquestionably going to be increasingly difficult to persuade a 
country engaged in armed conflict with a Communist country, or an established 
government engaged in civil strife with a Communist uprising, that it must give 
Communist prisoners of war the benefits of the Convention while its own 
captured personnel do not even receive the minimum benefits of customary 
international law. They will undoubtedly tend to take the position that there 
must be a point at which the refusal of the Communist side to comply with the 
provisions of the Convention releases the other side from its obligations 
26 thereunder. 
II. Does Article 2 of the 1949 Convention Apply in Vietnam? 
Whether the fighting which is taking place in Vietnam constitutes an 
international armed conflict or a civil war has been the subject of considerable 
dispute. It is the official position of the United States that what is taking place 
in Vietnam is an international armed conflict?7 This position has received 
support from unofficial sources.28 Opponents of United States participation in 
the Vietnamese hostilities assert that it is a civil war?9 Before proceeding to a 
discussion of specific instances of the improper treatment of prisoners of war, 
let us examine the law applicable under the various possibilities. 
The first paragraph of Article 2 of the 1949 Convention provides that: 
[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. (Emphasis added). 
The meaning of the quoted provisions is clear; and at no time since the drafting 
of the Convention in 1949 has any state indicated the existence of any question 
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with respect to that meaning. In fact, it is among those provisions of the 
Convention which have been given both uniform interpretation and general 
30 
approval. 
The only specific legal excuse ever advanced by North Vietnam for its 
insistence that the Convention is not applicable, and that persons captured by it 
are not entided to the humanitarian protections afforded by the Convention, 
has been that there is no "declared war.,,31 It is surely beyond dispute that there 
is an "armed conflict" in Vietnam between two or more of the parties to the 
Convention. Under these circumstances, the fact that there has been no 
declaration of war, or that a state of war is not recognized as existing, is 
completely irrelevant to the requirement to apply the Convention. There is, 
then, no validity whatsoever to the sole legal reason put forward by North 
Vietnam to justify its refusal to apply the Convention by which it voluntarily 
elected to be bound a number of years before the armed conflict in Vietnam 
reached its present status.32 The wording used in drafting the first paragraph of 
Article 2 leaves no doubt that it was the intent of the Diplomatic Conference 
which approved it that the Convention be applicable in every instance of the 
use of armed force in international relations-and, beyond any shadow of doubt, 
this intent was attained. It appears equally clear that the refusal of North Vietnam 
to apply the Convention under the circumstances which exist in 
Vietnam-whether or not the United States is "waging a war of 
aggression,,33 -constitutes a blatant disregard of an international obligation, 
freely accepted. 
III. Does Article 3 of the Convention Apply in Vietnam? 
Ar . I 3 f h C . 34. . I: d " .. tic e 0 t e onvention IS sometimes relerre to as a convention 10 
miniature,,,35 or as a "mini-convention.,,36 The draftsmen attempted to include 
in a single article those basic humanitarian provisions which render 
prisoner-of-war status somewhat less horrendous than it inherendy is-thus, in 
a relatively simple manner, calling to the attention of the participants in a 
non-international armed conflict the s~ecific humanitarian rules which control 
their actions from the very outset. 7 Unfortunately, even this minunum 
38 
approach has frequendy proven unsuccessful. 
The idea of including in an international convention a provision regulating 
civil wars was extremely nove1.39 While the ICRC had been aiming for such 
an extension of the Geneva-type Conventions for many years, it was not 
successful in this respect until the 1949 Diplomatic Conference.40 The main 
objection voiced during the discussions in committee and in the plenary sessions 
of the Diplomatic Conference was that under a number of the proposals the 
established government would seemingly be required to apply the Convention 
even in cases ofbrigandage.41 The other problem that had to be solved was the 
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detennination as to which provisions of the Convention should in an appropriate 
case be applied.42 The compromise ultimately adopted left the term "armed 
conflict not of an international character" undefined-which; in effect, was a 
detennination to make the term as broad and all-encompassing as possible. On 
the other hand, the minimum provisions which the parties to the armed conflict 
are obligated to apply are enumerated at length, rather than providing for the 
application of the entire Convention (as the working draft had done) or of all 
provisions falling within certain broad categories (as the USSR had proposed). 43 
What is the effect of Article 3 of the Convention on the parties to an "armed 
conflict not of an international character?" As far as the established government 
is concerned, if it is a party to the Convention it is bound by the provisions of 
Article 3 just as much as it would be bound by all of the provisions of the 
Convention in an armed conflict of an international character.44 And the same 
is true of third states which intervene to support either side in a civil war.45 
The foregoing has caused comparatively few legal problems.46 Where 
problems arise, however, is with respect to the obligation of the insurgents. 
How, it will be asked, can the action of the established government in becoming 
a party to the Convention, an action perhaps taken many years before the 
rebellion was even contemplated, now be held to bind the insurgents ?47 This 
is the position taken by the NLF.48 While it may have some minimum legal 
basis-this is the most that can be said for it-there are a number of valid legal 
theories under which a finding that the insurgents are bound by the provisions 
of Article 3 can be fully justified. 49 
While Soviet legal writers do not specifically state that insurgents50 are bound 
by the provisions of Article 3, that is certainly the only logical conclusion which 
can be drawn from their writings. Thus, their widely distributed textbook states: 
[T]he Soviet delegation secured the [1949 Diplomatic] Conference's recognition 
of a number of important humane clauses which were included in the new 
Conventions. For example, the obligatory character of the application during 
armed conflicts which are not of an international character of such principles as 
the humane treatment of persons not taking a direct part in military operations or 
who have ceased to take part in these operations as a result of sickness, illness or 
. . . d 51 CaptIVIty, was recogruze .... 
It has been said that the established government cannot be prejudiced by 
applying Article 3, "for no Government can possibly claim that it is entitled to 
make use of torture and other inhuman acts prohibited by the Convention as a 
f b ·· . ,,52 I uld 'nl h hi means 0 com atmg Its enermes. t wo certal y seem t at t s argument 
is equally applicable to the insurgent party, for how can armed conflict be 
conducted with different rules controlling the actions of the two contending 
'd ..,53 SI es r 
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Finally, there is much merit in a further statement made in the official ICRC 
interpretation of Article 3 of the Convention to the effect that: 
If an insurgent party applies Article 3, so much the better for the victims of the 
conflict. No one will complain. Ifit does not apply it, it will prove that those who 
regard its actions as mere acts of anarchy or brigandage are right .... 54 
Certainly, any insurgent force or alleged "national liberation movement" which 
does not comply with the provisions of Article 3 requiring humane treatment, 
and prohibiting violence, murder, torture and maltreatment of prisoners of war 
falls within the category of brigands and terrorists. 
What if, despite the foregoing, insurgents take the position that they are not 
bound by the provisions of Article 3, and this position gains acceptance? Except 
for the rare case such as Algeria, where the insurgents themselves sought 
application of the Convention, 55 Article 3 will become a dead letter. Unusual, 
indeed, would be the government willing to grant captured insurgents the 
benefits flowing from Article 3 while knowing that its own personnel, when 
captured, are tortured, otherwise maltreated and slaughtered. Although the 
requirement for granting these benefits to captured insurgents is stated to be 
absolute, and not to be dependent upon reciprocity,56 once again it will be 
extremely difficult to convince any governtnent and its people that such a 
unilateral compliance should be expected of them. 
We may then be in a position in which there is no applicable international 
legislation governing the actions of the insurgents and we would, therefore, have 
need to resort to the customary law of war. What are the customary rules 
accepted by the civilized nations of the world? Are they binding upon insurgents? 
IV. The Pertinent Customary Law of War 
In the opinion rendered by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 
(hereinafter referred to as IMT), which all Communist nations seemingly regard 
as a revelation second only to those of Marx, Engels and Lenin (and, it is to be 
assumed, of Mao in China), it is stated that by 1939 the 1907 Hague 
Regulations57 were "declaratory of the laws and customs of war. ,,58 It is also 
there confirmed that an individual is not held as a prisoner of war for purposes 
of revenge or punishment, but merely to prevent him from further participation 
in the conflict and that he is, therefore, a helpless person whom it is contrary to 
military tradition to kill or injure. 59 One of the subsequent Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals, in deciding The High Command Case} 60 correcdy construed the IMT 
opinion as holding that by 1939 both the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929 
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention61 "were binding insofar as they were in 
substance an expression of international law as accepted by the civilized nations 
102 Levie on the Law of War 
of the world. ,,62 Every military force engaged in anned conflict, whether or not 
international in character, and whether representing an old or a new state, an 
established government or an insurgent party, is bound to comply with these 
established rules of the "civilized nations of the world." Failure to do so places 
that military force, and the political organization which it represents and from 
which it takes its orders and policies, in direct violation of the foregoing 
··1 . d N b 63 pnncip es enunCIate at urem erg. 
The Tribunal in The High Commatld Case did not limit itself to the general 
statement that the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva 
Prisoner-of-War Convention now represented customary law. Inasmuch as 
there were obviously provision in those two Conventions dealing with details 
which could not be construed as customary law, the Tribunal assumed the task 
of designating exactly which provisions of the two agreements did fall within 
that category. It proceeded to review the specific provisions of each of the two 
Conventions and found that those provisions requiring humane treatment of 
prisoners of war, and those protecting them from acts of violence, insults, public 
curiosity, corporal punishment and acts of cruelty, were "an expression of the 
d · f ·vili· d . ,,64 accepte VIews 0 Cl ze natIOns. 
Of course, the Tribunal in The High Command Case was concerned only with 
those aspects of the law accepted by civilized nations of the world under which 
violations had been proven in the case before it. Its list is not, therefore, 
all-inclusive. Some writers have extended it to include the four groupings listed 
in Article 3 of the Convention,65 probably on the extremell plausible theory 
that in rejecting both the ICRC and USSR proposals6 the Diplomatic 
Conference had selected for inclusion in Article 3 (to be binding on both sides 
in a civil war) only those humanitarian principles which alreacr had received 
demonstrable acceptance by the civilized nations of the world.6 It also appears 
that both the Tribunals and the writers have definite ideas with respect to the 
imposition upon prisoners of war of vicarious punishment in the fonn of 
. als 68 repns . 
Do these customary rules of warfare apply to insurgents? There seems little 
doubt that they do, even though the rules have so frequently been honored only 
in the breach. The Soviet textbook states that "the laws and customs of war 
apply not only to armies in the strict sense of the word, but also to levies, 
voluntary detachments, organised resistance movements and partisans. ,,69 Under 
existing circumstances, where every insurgent movement other than one which 
is avowedly anti-Communist immediately becomes a "national liberation 
movement" enjoying full Communist support, further citation of authority 
would appear to be redundant. 
From the foregoing, it may be properly concluded that apart from any 
international legislation represented by the Hague or Geneva or other 
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Conventions, minimum customary law requires that prisoners of war be treated 
humanely; forbids the use against them of all forms of violence including corporal 
punishment, torture, cruelty and killing; and protects them from insults and 
public curiosity. With this in mind, we may now proceed to an examination of 
the incidents reported to have occurred or to have been threatened in Vietnam, 
applying the provisions of the Convention generally, those of Article 3, or 
. . all h . 70 customary mtematlon aw were appropnate. 
V. Charges Made Against the United States 
It has already been pointed out that the United States responded'prompdy to 
the ICRC letter concerning the application of the Geneva Conventions in 
Vietnam and committed itself to apply the 1949 Convention.71 This 
commitment was thereafter adopted by the various nations which have furnished 
military forces to sup~ort South Vietnam and it has been reiterated on several 
appropriate occasions. 2 Although, strangely enough, no report has been found 
of a Vietcong or North Vietnamese charge of improper treatment of their 
captured personnel by United States military forces in Vietnam,73 there has been 
one charge of improper action in this respect made in the United States. 
As early as 1964, when American personnel.were serving in Vietnam solely 
as advisers to South Vietnamese military units, reports began to reach the United 
States of the maltreatment ofVietcong prisoners of war by members of the South 
Vietnamese combat forces?4 American photographers and newsmen were 
present during these episodes and, presumably, American military personnel 
were also present. Photographs of this nature continued to appear in the 
American press from time to time durin? 1965 and occasionally, although much 
more rarely, during subsequent years? In a few instances American personnel 
were pictured standing by while the maltreatment of the prisoners of war 
occurred.76 These incidents apparendy took place either at the scene of the 
fighting or during evacuation from it. 
Humanitarian reaction to these clear indications of violations of the 
Convention quickly appeared in the United States.77 The legal problem 
presented by these incidents, in view of the nature of the United States position 
in Vietnam, is whether the United States had a duty or was in a ;osition to do 
more than remonstrate with the South Vietnamese authorities? 
There is no provision in the Convention making a contracting party 
responsible for violations committed by one of its allies against prisoners of war 
captured and held by that ally. A search of the Final Record of the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference which drafted the Convention has failed to bring to 
light even a suggestion to this effect made by any delegation?9 The reasons for 
this lacuna are obvious. To have included such a provision would have created 
vicarious responsibility for a situation which, in the great majority of cases, could 
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not be remedied by the state so held responsible. Moreover, no state would 
willingly accept a responsibility which could well bring it into sharp conflict 
with one or several of its allies during the course of a life-or-death struggle. 
There was, then, no legal duty imposed upon the United States by the 1949 
Convention to ensure that South Vietnamese troops did not maltreat personnel 
captured by them. Of course, it is equally clear that the United States (and every 
other contracting party) is under a moral obligation to exert all its influence to 
bring ~bout full compliance with the relevant provisions of the Convention by 
any other party engaged in armed conflict.80 
When units of the United States armed forces were committed to combat a 
new situation arose, because, unlike the earlier period just mentioned, the 
United States itself then began to take prisoners of war. These prisoners were 
turned over to the South Vietnamese for detention in prisoner-of-war camps. 
At first, the transfer of custody was made in the field immediately upon capture. 
But apparently because most of the incidents of maltreatment occurred at this 
time and in this area, in mid-1966 the United States changed its procedure. 
Thereafter, prisoners of war captured by United States units were evacuated to 
divisional headquarters and from there directly to the rear-area prisoner-of-war 
camps maintained by the South Vietnamese.81 The United States 
Commander-in-Chief in Vietnam has stated categorically that "these prisoners 
are not being mistreated. They are handled in accordance with the provisions 
of the Geneva Conventions.,,82 There is no evidence to indicate that his 
statement is not correct, nor have any claims been made which contradict it.83 
Of course, even after prisoners of war captured by United States forces reach 
the camps and are turned over to the custody of the South Vietnamese, the 
United States remains under a contingent responsibility for their humane 
. da . h h . . f h C . 84 treatment In accor nce WIt t e proVIslons 0 t e onventlon. 
VI. Charges Made Against South Vietnam 
There appears to be little doubt that at least well into 1966 South Vietnamese 
combat troops regularly maltreated captured enemy personnel by using threats, 
torture, and other acts of violence in order to obtain intelligence information.85 
These acts were and remain direct violations of the law of war, whether 
considered from the point of view of the entire Convention, Article 3, or 
customary international law. The combined pressure of the ICRC and the 
United States (and, perhaps, of other allied countries) has apparently gradually 
made itself felt, at least at the official level. The Government of South Vietnam 
has complied with the Convention by a liberal interpretation of the provisions 
of Article 4 defining the categories of persons entitled to prisoner-of-war status, 86 
by supplying lists of persons detained as prisoners of war to the Central Tracing 
Agency of the ICRC,87 by disseminating to its troops information concerning 
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the duties imposed upon captors by the Convention and by other methods of 
instruction of its troops,88 and by permitting unlimited inspection visits to the 
prisoner-of-war camps by delegates of the ICRC.89 The fact that reports of 
further instances of maltreatment of prisoners of war by South Vietnamese 
combat troops have become more sporadic probably indicates that the campaign 
of education has had some degree of success. However, it may also mean that 
South Vietnamese combat commanders have been able to conceal most of such 
incidents from those who might report them. 
To summarize: while the South Vietnamese Government has now 
substantially complied with the obligations which the Convention imposes upon 
it, during the course of a period extending over several years there was apparendy 
an officially countenanced practice of the use of torture on newly-captured 
prisoners of war by South Vietnamese combat troops for the purpose of 
extracting information from them. The South Vietnamese Government appears 
now to accept the fact that such conduct constituted a direct and major violation 
of the Convention and, therefore, in 1966 instituted a campaign of education 
which seems to have been at least partially successful in putting an end to this 
grossly illegal practice. However, instances of maltreatment of newly-captured 
prisoners of war by South Vietnamese combat troops continue to be reported.90 
The individuals responsible for such incidents, both soldiers who commit the 
actual violence and commanders who permit and even encourage these acts, are 
guilty of violations of the Convention and of the customary law of war. 
VII. Charges Made Against North Vietnam 
A. Paraditlg Prisoners of War 
With respect to the North Vietnamese treatment of American prisoners of 
war we have only the information which they have seen fit to disclose.91 
However, even this limited source of information has revealed one major 
violation of the Convention and the threat of what was asserted to be another. 
While this latter was apparendy prevented by an unprecedented mobilization of 
world opinion by the United States, it will be discussed below in section VII B. 
OnJuly 6, 1966, presumably to whip up local support for the trial of captured 
American pilots as "war criminals,,,92 the North Vietnamese authorities caused 
these men, handcuffed in pairs, to be paraded through the crowd-lined streets 
of Hanoi. Word of the incident was broadcast by Radio Hanoi93 and press 
releases94 and photographs95 were issued by the official North Vietnamese press 
agency. 
The United States Government immediately charged that this constituted a 
violation of the Convention.96 The ICRC clearly was of the same opinion, for 
onJuly 14, 1966, it drew the attention of the North Vietnamese Government 
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to the fact that the Convention specifically prohibited the subjection of prisoners 
of war to public curiosity.97 The North Vietnamese did not deny the occurrence 
of the incident; they merely called attention to their Krevious communications 
concerning the nonapplicability of the Convention.9 
In May, 1967, Agence France Presse (the French news agency) reported from 
Hanoi that three captured American pilots, one of whom was apparently 
suffering from an injury, "were paraded through angry, shouting crowds" on 
the streets of Hanoi and were later "put on display" at the International Press 
Club in Hanoi.99 Once again the United States Government immediately 
charged that this constituted a "flagrant violation" of the Convention and stated 
that it was sending a protest to North Vietnam through the ICRC.100 
Over a century ago Francis Lieber's first codification of the customary law of 
war included a statement to the effect that prisoners of war were not to be 
subjected to any "indignity." 101 The 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War 
Convention,102 the predecessor of the Convention with which we are here 
concerned, had (in its Article 2) a prohibition against subjecting prisoners of war 
to "insults and public curiosity." In interpreting this provision in the course of 
World War II, the Judge Advocate General of the Army said: "The 'public 
curiosity' against which Article 2 ... protects them is the curious and perhaps 
scornful gaze of the crowd .... " 1 03 During World War II a group of American 
prisoners of war was marched through the streets of Rome by the Nazis as a 
propaganda measure. Mter the war the Nazi commander responsible for the 
march was tried and convicted of the war crime of failini1 to protect prisoners 
of war in his custody from insults and public curiosity. 04 The International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Pacific counterpart of the International 
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg fame, included in its opinion a heading entitled 
"Prisoners of War Humiliated" and listed thereunder various episodes in which 
prisoners of war had been marched down city streets and exhibited to jeering 
crowds, specifically labeling such treatment as a violation of the law of war. 10 
It has already been noted that the Military Tribunal which heard TIle High 
Command Case at Nuremberg found that the protection of prisoners of war from 
insults and public curiosity was a part of the customary law of war recognized 
b 'vili' d . 106 Y Cl ze nacrons. 
Both Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention contain provisions which prohibit 
the exhibiting of prisoners of war by parading them through city streets; and it 
would appear that this rule has most probably attained the status of being part 
of the customary law of war. 107 It follows that the actions of North Vietnamese 
authorities on the two occasions mentioned (and on other less well publicized 
occasions) were violations of the Convention and of the customary law of 
108 
war. 
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B. War Crimes Trials 
It will be recalled that in answering the letter from the ICRC in August, 
1965, North Vietnam referred to captured American pilots as "major [war] 
criminals caught in flagrante delicto and liable for judgment in accordance with 
the laws of the Democratic Republic ofVietnam." 109 Many statements of similar 
import were subsequently made by the North VietnameseYO By mid-July, 
1966, press dispatches from Communist newsmen in Hanoi were mentioning 
that trials were definitely plannedll1 and tension began to build in the United 
States.112 It was then that the United States mounted a diplomatic offensive 
which resulted in the intervention of personages from around the world, 
including those who sided with the United States position in Vietnam, those 
who opposed it, and those who were neutral.113 On July 23, 1966, the North 
Vietnamese Government announced the appointment of a committee "to 
investigate United States 'war crimes",114 and then, on that same day, North 
Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh took advantage of a cabled inquiry from the 
Columbia Broadcasting System to state that there was "no trial in view" for the 
American pilots. lIS A few days later Ho was quoted as saying that the "main 
criminals" were not captured pilots, "but the persons who sent them 
there-Johnson, Rusk, McNamara-these are the ones who should be brought 
to trial.,,116 For ten days inJuly, 1966, there was excitement and debate on this 
subject throughout the world, with claims, counterclaims, and citation oflegal 
authorities and purported legal authorities for and against the trial. 
Actually, the statement and allegations made by the North Vietnamese in 
their August 31, 1965, letter to the ICRC and frequently thereafter pose two 
interwoven questions concerning the captured American pilots: (1) are they 
entitled to the status of prisoners of war? and (2) do the North Vietnamese have 
the right to try them for alleged war crimes ? It will be appropriate to discuss 
these two questions in the order stated. 
The captured pilots are all members of the United States Navy and Air Force. 
They were captured when forced to eject from their planes while flying combat 
missions over North Vietnam. They were wearing American flight uniforms 
when captured and made no attempt to hide their identity. (Of course, this series 
of statements includes a number of assumptions-but they all appear to be 
reasonable ones and there is no indication that anyone of them is really disputed.) 
These facts being accepted, the American pilots are entitled prima facie to 
prisoner-of-war status under the 1907 Hague Regulations,117 the 1929 Geneva 
Prisoner of-War Convention,118 and the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War 
Convention. 119 In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a more clear-cut case 
of entitlement to such status. 
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The North Vietnamese apparendy do not contest the facts stated and assumed 
above, but they attempt to avoid the conclusion which necessarily flows from 
these facts by asserting that the Convention does not apply to "war criminals." 120 
The syllogism would be: war criminals are not entitled to the protection of the 
Convention; American pilots are war criminals; therefore, American pilots are 
not entided to the protection of the Convention. Both the major and the minor 
premises of that syllogism are incorrect. The North Vietnamese position 
therefore necessitates a brief review of the events preceding and following the 
approval of Article 85 of the Convention by the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference. 121 
When the war in the Pacific ended in 1945, General Yamashita, who had 
commanded the unsuccessful Japanese defense of the Phillipine Islands, was 
charged with a number of war crimes and was brought to trial before an 
American Military Commission in Manila. His counsel contended that he was 
entided to all of the trial protections contained in the 1929 Prisoner-of-War 
Convention. These protections were denied to him and on appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court (after his conviction and death sentence) the denial was 
affirmed on the ground that the trial protections contained in that Convention 
applied only to trials for post-capture--not pre-capture--offenses.122 
In the preparatory work which preceded the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, 
the ICRC convened a group of "Government Experts" who recommended, as 
one variation from the 1929 Convention, a provision that prisoners of war 
prosecuted for pre-capture offenses should enjoy the benefits of the Convention 
until convicted after a regular trial. When this was submitted to the XVIIth 
International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in 1948, where the final draft 
which was to be the working draft for the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was 
prepared, it was decided to change the provision drafted by the Government 
Experts so that prisoners of war would continue to benefit by the provisions of 
h C . .Ii •. f ffc 123 t e onventlon even '!I,er convlctlon 0 a pre-capture 0 ense. 
At the Diplomatic Conference, the USSR proposed an amendment to the 
draft provision under which once a prisoner of war had been convicted of a war 
crime (apparendy this meant a conventional war crime) or a crime against 
humanity, he could be treated as an ordinary criminal.124 This was, in effect, a 
return to the recommendation made by the Government Experts. General 
Slavin, chief delegate of the USSR, stated to the committee charged with the 
preparation of the Prisoner-of-War Convention, that the USSR proposal 
applied only to prisoners of war who had been convicted.125 The committee's 
report to the Plenary Meeting called attention to the difference of approach 
represented by the Stockholm draft and the USSR proposal, and stated that the 
great majority of the committee considered that even after a prisoner of war had 
been convicted of a pre-capture violation of the laws and customs of war, he 
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should continue to enjoy the protection of the Convention. 126 The Diplomatic 
Conference rejected the Soviet proposal and approved the Stockholm draft 
.. 127 provlSlon. 
The effect of Article 85 of the Convention was, then, to change the rule 
expounded in Yamashita and other similar cases.128 Now a prisoner of war retains 
the benefits of the Convention from the moment of capture to the moment of 
release and repatriation. If, while in captivity, he is tried and convicted of a 
pre-capture violation of the law of war he is entided to all the judicial safeguards 
f h C . 129 o t e onventlon. 
The USSR and all of the other Communist countries, both those present at 
the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva and those which subsequendy adhered 
to the Convention, have made reservations to Article 85.130 This fact caused 
some concern to the United States Senate when it was asked to give its advice 
and consent to the ratification of the Convention by the President. In its report 
to the Senate the Committee on Foreign Relations said: 
[I]n the light of the practice adopted by Communist forces in Korea of calling 
prisoners of war "war criminals," there is the possibility that the Soviet bloc might 
adopt the general attitude of regarding a significant number of the forces opposing 
them as ipso facto war criminals, not entided to the usual guaranties provided for 
prisoners of war. As indicated above, however, the Soviet reservation expressly 
deprives prisoners of war of the protection of the convention only after conviction 
in accordance with the convention.131 
When North Vietnam advised the Swiss Government of its adherence to the 
four 1949 Geneva Conventions in June 1957, the communication included a 
reservation to Article 85 reading as follows: 
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that prisoners of war prosecuted 
for and convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in accordance with 
the principles laid down by the Nuremberg Court of Justice shall not benefit from 
the present Convention, as specified in Article 85.132 
Having made this reservation, it must be assumed that the North Vietnamese 
authorities fully understood its meaning-and it is difficult to find any real 
ambiguity in it so far as the present problem is concerned.133 The American 
pilots have not been "prosecuted and convicted." Under Article 85 of the 
Convention and the North Vietnamese reservation to it, they are entided to the 
benefits of the Convention until prosecution and conviction for war crimes or 
crimes against humanity have occurred. The North Vietnamese contention that 
the American pilots are "war criminals" and not entided to the protection of 
h C .. h fc • h . 134 I ., d f . 1£ . t e onventlon IS, t ere ore, Wlt out ment. t IS, In an 0 Itse , a major 
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violation of the Convention to arbitrarily deny prisoner-of-war status to 
individuals entitled to that status. If the North Vietnamese desire to comply with 
the international commitment which they have made by voluntarily adhering 
to the Convention, they are under an obligation to recognize that American 
pilots captured while flying combat missions over North Vietnam are entitled 
to the status of prisoners of war and to the protections provided by the 
Convention which flow from that status. 
The first question posed above, are American pilots entitled to the status of 
prisoners of war, must be answered in the affirmative. This leads us to the second 
question, do the North Vietnamese have the right to try them for alleged war 
crimes? 
In the discussions which took place in connection with the drafting of Article 
85, it was at no time suggested by any delegation that prisoner-of-war status 
should protect an individual from prosecution for an alleged pre-capture offense 
which constituted a violation of the law of war. In fact, all of the parties who 
engaged in the discussion apparently assumed that this was the rule. As we have 
just seen, the only dispute on this subject concerned the regime under which 
the detaining power would be entitled to place the individual qfter his trial and 
conviction for a pre-capture offense. Under the circumstances, there seems to 
be little doubt that the second question posed, do the North Vietnamese have 
the right to try the American pilots for war crimes alleged to have been 
committed prior to capture, should also be answered in the affirmative. 
However, this answer requires amplification, because standing alone it is 
subject to misconstruction. In the first place, the right to try a prisoner of war 
for an offense which he is alleged to have committed prior to capture does not 
mean that there is a right to treat him prior to trial and conviction in the manner 
in which he mig~t be treated qfter trial and conviction. (This, of course, is 
inherent in the discussion and resolution of the first question on this subject 
discussed immediately above.) In other words, a prisoner of war retains the status 
of prisoner of war, and all the protections incident thereto, at least until he has 
been finally convided. 
In the second place, while it appears that the North Vietnamese charge against 
the American pilots is that they have been guilty of bombing nonmilitary targets, 
such as civilian residential areas,135 at this stage in the development of the law 
of war, there may be considerable doubt expressed as to whether even 
"target-area" bombing, a much more indiscriminate and inhumane act than that 
apparently charged against the American airmen, is a violation of international 
law. During World War II both sides engaged in this type of warfare. No one 
who lived through that period or has read its history could have forgotten the 
German bombing of such targets as Warsaw, London, Coventry and Rotterdam, 
and the Allied bombing of Berlin, Essen, Cologne and Tokyo. No political 
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leader, no military commander, and no ainnan was ever convicted of any alleged 
war crime arising out of these activities.136 One will look in vain in the opinions 
of the IMT or of the IMTFE for any reference to such activities as constituting 
a war crime. For more than ten years the ICRC has been endeavoring, so far 
with not even a modicum of success, to evolve a convention which would 
protect the civilian pOfulations in time of war and which would be acceptable 
to the governments.13 This &roposed Convention, in its Article 10, specifically 
forbids target-area bombing. 8 The fact that it is considered necessary to include 
such a prohibition in a new draft international convention on the law of war 
would seem to indicate rather conclusively that no such prohibition is presendy 
included therein.139 And, as has been stated, if target-area bombing is not 
definitely oudawed, then certainly the lesser charge which appears to have been 
levelled against the American pilots does not come within a prohibited category. 
In the third place, we have moved far along the road from the era of vicarious 
punishment to a point where individuals are punished only for their own acts. 
While evidence, such as "confessions," might be available to the North 
Vietnamese with respect to some of the airmen, what of the others? Why is the 
charge of being a war criminal levelled against every captured American airman 
held by the North Vietnamese?140 Certainly, there is no evidence available to 
them that every captured American airman participated in bombing or other 
attacks on purely civilian targets. Some of the ainnen were probably shot down 
on their first missions before they could drop a bomb. Some were probably 
flying in unarmed reconnaissance planes, perhaps as photographers. Some were 
probably flying fighter protection armed only with air-to-air weapons. These, 
and probably many others, are within categories against whom no legitimate 
. h b l·d . h· . h h 141 war-cnmes c arge can e aI , even assurrung t at It can agaInst t e ot ers. 
Finally, there arises the problem of whether prisoners of war accused of 
pre-capture war crimes can be or should be tried during the course of hostilities. 
On this subject the author has previously said: 
While there was never any concrete proposal made at the Diplomatic 
Conference that trials of prisoners of war for pre-capture offenses should be 
postponed until the cessation of hostilities, the matter was the subject of 
inconclusive discussion during the debate on Article 85, two delegates (Lamarle 
of France and Slavin of the U.S.S.R.) expressing the opinion that such trials should 
not be put off until the close of hostilities, and one delegate (Gardner of the United 
Kingdom) expressing the opposite view. The International Committee of the Red 
Goss has long taken the position that, if such a trial is conducted during the course 
of hostilities, an accused does not have a fair opportunity to produce all of the 
evidence which might be available to disprove or lessen his responsibility. 
As we have already seen, a number of prisoners of war were tried for alleged 
pre-capture offenses during the course ofW orId War II. The patent un£rirness of 
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these trials glaringly reveals the danger of trials for pre-capture offenses conducted 
during the course of the war.142 
To summarize: captured American ainnen are entitled to the status of 
prisoners of war until such time as they have been prosecuted and convicted of 
pre-capture violations of the law of war; while they may legally be tried during 
the course of hostilities, there are serious practical objections to such a procedure; 
and, if they are tried, they must be afforded all of the judicial safeguards contained 
in the Convention. 
VIII. Charges Made Against the Vietcong 
Very little infonnation is available as to how many prisoners of war, American 
or South Vietnamese, are held by the Vietcong; even less is known as to how 
they are being treated. However, there is reason to know that they do hold some 
American prisoners of war-and that there have been at least two identical 
instances of major violations of the law of war in the treatment of prisoners by 
the Vietcong. 
As we have seen, despite Vietcong insistence to the contrary, the generally 
accepted position appears to be that insurgents such as the Vietcong are bound 
by the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention; 143 and that, in any event, they 
are at a minimum bound by the customary law ofwar.144 Specifically, it appears 
to be well established that customary international law prohibits the use of 
violence and acts of cruelty against prisoners of war and, in all probability, also 
prohibits making them the objects of reprisals. 145 
On April 9, 1965, a Vietcong terrorist was tried, convicted and sentenced to 
death by a South Vietnamese court. At that time the Vietcong announced that 
if the sentence of execution was carried out, Gustav C. Hertz, a kidnapped 
civilian American aid officer, would be shot. 146 The terrorist was apparently not 
executed. Whether or not the threat against Hertz was the reason for the 
clemency shown the terrorist has not been disclosed. 
On June 22, 1965, another Vietcong terrorist was executed by a South 
Vietnamese firing squad in Saigon after he had been tried, convicted and 
sentenced for acts of terrorism by a South Vietnamese special military court.147 
Three days later both Radio Hanoi and the Liberation Radio announced that 
an American soldier held as a prisoner of war by the Vietcong (Sergeant Harold 
G. Bennett) had been executed in reprisal for the execution of the Vietcong 
terrorist.148 The United States labeled the act as "murder"; and a statement 
released by the Department of State said that "people around the world cannot 
help but be appalled and revolted by this show of wanton inhumanity.,,149 
On September 22, 1965, three more Vietcong terrorists were executed in Da 
Nang after a trial, conviction and death sentence by a South Vietnamese court. 
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Four days later, on September 26, the Liberation Radio announced that the 
Vietcong had retaliated by the executions of two American prisoners of war, 
Captain Humbert R. V ersage [Versace] and Sergeant Kenneth M. Roraback.150 
Once again the United States labeled these reprisal executions as "murder" and 
as violations of the Convention.151 It filed a protest with the ICRC which was 
transmitted to and rejected by the NLF.152 
A "reprisal" is defined as an otherwise illegal act committed by one side in 
an armed conflict in order to put pressure on the other side to compel it to 
abandon a course of illegal acts which it has been committing and to comply 
with the law of war.153 For a reprisal (a normally illegal act) to be legal there 
are three requirements: the act of the state against which it is directed must have 
been illegal; it must not be directed against an individual who, by the law of 
war, is specifically protected against reprisals or against acts of the nature that the 
contemplated reprisal will take; and it must be directed against the state which 
first violated the law of war. 
Were the alleged acts of reprisal of the Vietcong mentioned above valid 
applications of the rules governing reprisals? The first requirement for a valid 
reprisal is that the act or acts against which it is directed have been illegal. The 
acts against which these reprisals were directed were the June 22 and September 
22, 1965, executions of the Vietcong terrorists. Were those executions illegal? 
According to the newspaper accounts, in each instance the individuals had been 
tried, convicted and sentenced by a South Vietnamese court in accordance with 
the law of South Vietnam.154 While the National Liberation Front called the 
June 22 execution "[a] crime of bloodthirsty men" 155 and presumably feels the 
same about the September 22 execution, it has never indicated in what way the 
executions constituted a crime- other than the implication that it is a crime to 
try, convict and execute a Vietcong apprehended in the course of committing 
what was probably a Vietcong approved and ordered act of terrorism. 
The reprisals, then, failed to meet the first requirement for a valid reprisal, 
that it be called forth by an illegal act by the other side. Now let us examine the 
second requirement for a reprisal to be valid under the law of war-that it not 
be directed against a specifically protected person. Shortly after the Second 
Hague Peace Conference of 1907 the German War Office issued a War Book 
which escaped general attention until some years later. During the course of 
World War I, it became well known and widely condemned because of its 
emphasis on the the principle of military necessity and its disregard for the 
customary and conventional law of war. Concerning reprisals against prisoners 
of war the War Book said: 
As regards the admissibility of reprisals, it is to be remarked that these are 
objected to by numerous teachers ofintemationallaw on grounds of humanity. 
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To make this a matter of principle and apply it to every case, exhibits however, 
"a misconception due to intelligible but exaggerated and unjustifiable feelings of 
humanity, of the significance, the seriousness and the right of war. It must not be 
overlooked that here also the necessity of war, and the safety of the State are the 
first consideration, and not regard for the unconditional freedom of prisoners from 
molestation. " 
That prisoners should only be killed in the event of extreme necessity, and that 
only the duty of self-preservation and the security of one's own State can justify 
a proceeding of this kind is today universally admitted.156 
Thus, even a directive which was subjected to almost universal condemnation 
limited reprisals against prisoners of war to cases of "extreme necessity," 
self-preservation, and the security of the State. 
World War I so vividly demonstrated the inhumanity of reprisals against 
helpless prisoners of war that restrictions on the use of this procedure were 
incorporated into a number of agreements reached by the belligerents for the 
protection of prisoners of war during the course of those hostilities. 157 A specific 
provision completely prohibiting re~risals against prisoners of war was thereafter 
included in the 1929 Convention.! 8 
Writing in 1942, an American scholar stated that "it seems reasonable to 
assume that reprisals, with prisoners of war as the objects, are permissible within 
limits in customary intemationallaw.,,159 A few years later the legality of reprisals 
against civilian hostages was considered at great length in The Hostage Case, a 
decision by one of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. The Tribunal said: 
It is a fundamental rule of justice that the lives of persons may not be arbitrarily 
taken. A fair trial before a judicial body affords the surest protection against 
arbitrary, vindictive, or whimsical application of the right to shoot human beings 
in reprisal. It is a rule of intemationallaw, based on these fundamental concepts 
of justice and the rights of individuals, that the lives of persons may not be taken 
in reprisal in the absence of a judicial finding that the necessary conditions exist 
and the essential steps have been taken to give validity to such action .... We 
have no hesitancy in holding that the killing of members of the population in 
reprisal without judicial sanction is itself unlawful. 160 
Inasmuch as members of the general public had not then been recognized as 
specially protected persons, it would appear that, a fortiori, everything the 
Tribunal said about the protections to which civilians were entitled would apply 
to prisoners of war. 
In considering the opinion quoted above, another Nuremberg Military 
Tribunal, which would probably not have permitted reprisal executions under 
any circumstances, stated in its opinion in The High Command Case: 
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In the Southeast Case [Hostage Case], United States v. Wilhelm List, et al., 
(Case No.7), the Tribunal had occasion to consider at considerable length the 
law relating to hostages and reprisals. It was therein held that under certain very 
restrictive conditions and subject to certain rather extensive safeguards, hostages 
may be taken, and after a judicial finding of strict compliance with all preconditions 
and as a last desperate remedy hostages may even be sentenced to death. It was 
held further that similar drastic safeguards, restrictions, and judicial preconditions 
apply to so-called "reprisal prisoners." If so inhumane a measure as the killing oj 
innocent persons Jor offenses oj others, even when drastically soJeguarded and limited, is ever 
pennissible under any theory oj international law, killing without Jull compliance with all 
requirements would be murder.lfkilling is not pennissible under any circumstances, then a 
killing with Jull compliance with all the mentioned prerequisites still would be murder. 
. . . In the instance of so-called hostage taking and killing, and the so-called 
reprisal killings with which we have to deal in this case, the safeguards and 
preconditions required to be observed by the Southeast judgment were not even 
attempted to be met or even suggested as necessary. Killings without compliance 
with such preconditions are merely terror murders. If the law is in fact that hostage 
and reprisal killings are never permissible at all, then also the so-called hostage and 
. al killi· . thi I d 161 repns ngs In s case are mere y terror mur ers. 
And in reviewing the overall war crimes program which followed World War 
II and the law which evolved from it, the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, in publications issued in 1947 and in 1949, stated without 
equivocation that the killing of prisoners of war without due cause violated both 
d . al· . all 162 customary an conventJon mternatJon aw. 
Undeniably, then, there are compelling arguments to support the position 
that reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited by customary international 
law. But even if one is unwilling to accept these arguments, certainly customary 
international law does specifically prohibit all acts of cruelty and violence against 
prisoners of war, 163 -who are, therefore, protected persons in so far as this type 
of treatment is concerned. And with equal certainty it can be stated that in all 
civilized countries killing is an act both of cruelty and of violence. Hence, killing 
a prisoner of war as a reprisal constitutes cruelty and violence against a person 
who is protected from such treatment by customary international law. The 
reprisals, then, also failed to meet the second requirement for a valid reprisal, 
that they not be directed against a protected person. 
The third requirement for a legal reprisal under international law is that it be 
directed against the state which had first violated the law of war. 164 The" crime" 
charged by the NLF as the basis for the reprisal was, beyond dispute, an act of 
the South Vietnamese authorities, and not of the American authorities. The 
alleged acts of terrorism were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of 
South Vietnam, the culprits were tried by South Vietnamese courts which 
reached the decisions finding guilt and ordered the death sentence imposed, and 
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the executions were carried out by the South Vietnamese authorities. If reprisals 
were justified, and no ground for them has so far come to light, under the law 
of war they should have been directed against the state which had by its alleged 
illegal conduct created the need for and the right to take reprisals. This was 
obviously not done-and the reason why it was not done is equally obvious. 
To summarize: to be authorized by international law, reprisals, which are 
otherwise illegal acts, must meet certain specific conditions. The undisputed 
facts clearly disclose that the Vietcong had no legal justification for taking reprisals 
and, moreover, that the reprisals were taken against prisoners of war who were 
protected persons under customary international law and against whom reprisals, 
especially of a cruel or violent character, were specifically prohibited both by 
international legislation binding upon the Vietcong and by customary 
international law. Under these circumstances, the reprisals taken against the 
American prisoners of war were nothing less than murder and constituted war 
crimes for which, pursuant to the Nuremberg principles upon which the 
Communists so heavily rely, those who ordered the executions and those who 
carried them out are all subject to penal sanctions. 
IX. Conclusion 
A number of conclusions have been reached in the course of this discussion. 
To recapitulate: 
1. There is no legal justification for the position taken by the North 
Vietnamese that they are not bound by the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War 
Convention. At the very least, they are bound by the provisions of Article 3 
thereo£ 
2. While there is some legal basis for the position taken by the NLF that it 
is not even bound by the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention, on balance 
the decision probably should be that it is so bound. In any event, it is bound by 
the customary law of war. 
3. A state which is a party to hostilities is not legally responsible when an ally 
violates the provisions of the Convention, but it is morally bound to attempt to 
persuade its ally to conform to the obligations accepted by adhering to the 
Convention. It does have a contingent responsibility for the proper treatment 
of prisoners of war captured by its armed forces and turned over to the custody 
of an ally for detention. 
4. Torture or other maltreatment of prisoners of war in order to obtain 
intelligence information from them, or for any other reason, or for no reason, 
constitutes a serious violation of the Convention. 
5. Parading prisoners of war before a hostile populace constitutes a violation 
of the prohibition, contained in conventional and customary international law, 
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against subjecting them to insults, public curiosity and humiliating and degrading 
conduct. 
6. Even under a reservation to Article 85 of the Convention, such as that 
made by North Vietnam, it is a serious violation of the Convention to deny 
captured enemy personnel prisoner-of-war status on the ground that they are 
war criminals prior to their prosecution and conviction of a pre-capture war crime 
by a trial court in which they have been accorded all of the required judicial 
safeguards. 
7. There is no legal impediment to the trial of a prisoner of war for an alleged 
pre-capture war crime while hostilities are still being conducted. However, as 
noted immediately above, such a prisoner of war continues to be entided to all 
of the protection of the Convention, including the judicial safeguards therein 
contained. 
8. Reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited by the Convention and, 
probably, by customary international law. In any event, a reprisal which includes 
a corporal act, such as killing, against a prisoner of war is prohibited by Article 
3 of the Convention and by customary international law, both of which prohibit 
cruelty and acts of violence against prisoners of war. 
And finally, although the application of the Convention is presumably not 
dependent upon reciprocity, persistent and regular refusal by the Communist 
nations to be bound by it during actual cases of anned conflict in which they 
are involved may compel other countries to give second thoughts to the doctrine 
which requires compliance without reciprocal compliance. 
Notes 
1. P.L. 88-408,79 Stat. 384, approved August 10, 1964 
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross is a century-old humanitarian organization composed 
entirely of Swiss citizens which maintains a stricdy neutral status in all armed conflicts, offering its services 
equally to both sides. Since 1864 it has been the motivating force behind the series of humanitarian "Geneva" 
Conventions. Its status and activities in wartime are officially recognized and formalized in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, note 4 infra. 
3. This letter, dated June 11, 1965, was sent to the governments of the United States, the Republic of 
Vietnam (hereinafter referred to as South Vietnam), and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (hereinafter 
referred to as North Vietnam). The ICRC stated therein that it would "endeavor to deliver it also to the 
National Liberation Front." 60 Am.]. Int'l L 92 (1966), 4 Int'l Legal Mat. 1171 (1965). 
4. There are four of these Conventions. Our concern here will be solely with the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisonelS of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter referred to as the Convention]. The United States ratified this Convention on August 2, 1955. 
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I A.S. No. 3364, 213 U.N.T.S. 383. South Vietnam adhered to it (as the State of Vietnam) 
on Nov. 14, 1953 (181 U.N.T.S. 351). North Vietnam adhered to it on June 28,1957 (274 U.N.T.S. 339). 
Ratifications and adherences by other States involved in Vietnam, either direcdy or indirecdy, are as follows: 
Republic of the Philippines, Oct. 61952 (141 U.N.T.S. 384); USSR, May 10, 1954 (191 U.N.T.S. 367); 
Thailand, Dec. 29, 1954 (202 U.N.T.S. 332); People's Republic of China, Dec. 28,1956 (260 U.N.T.S. 
442); Australia, Oct. 14, 1958 (314 U.N.T.S. 332); New Zealand, May 2,1959 (330 U.N.T.S. 356); and the 
Republic of Korea, Aug. 16, 1966 (55 Dep't State Bull. 694 (1966». 
5. Concerning the Prisoner-of-War Convention, the ICRC letter, supra note 3, said: "In particular 
the life of any combatant taken prisoner, wearing uniform or bearing an emblem clearly indicating his 
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membership in the anned forces, shall be spared, he shall be treated humanely as a prisoner of war, lists of 
combatants taken prisoner shall be communicated without delay to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (Central Information Agency), and the delegates of the ICRC shall be authorized to visit prison camps." 
The items so specified dearly indicate that the ICRC considered the armed conflict in Vietnam to be of an 
international character. Indeed, the tenor of the letter leaves no doubt on this score. 
6. 53 Dep't State Bull. 447 (1965), 4 Int'l Legal Mat. 1173 (1965), 5 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 477 
(1965). 
7. 4 Int'l Legal Mat. 1174 (1965), 5 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 478 (1965). As we shall see, these 
promises have not been fully carried out. 
8. 5 Int'l Legal Mat. 124 (1966), 5 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 527 (1965) (emphasis added) 
9. 5. Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 636 (1965). The final assertion was undoubtedly included because of 
the charge frequendy advanced by American combat troops that the Vietcong made a practice of shooting 
enemy wounded found on the batdefield. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1965, at 1, col. 8. 
10. We will not be concerned with violations of the technical provisions of the Convention; nor will 
we be concerned with the violations of a number of the more important humanitarian provisions of the 
Convention which have undoubtedly occurred, but as to which there is a paucity of acceptable facts presendy 
available. 
11. The Republic of Malawi adhered to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions onJan. 5, 1968, becoming 
the 117th Party to those Conventions. Letter to the author from the Swiss Federal Political Department,Jan. 
31,1968. 
12. See note 34 infra. 
13. For arguments supporting this position, see the remarks of General Nikolai Slavin, chief of the Soviet 
delegation at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference which drafted the Conventions. Final Record of the Diplomatic 
Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. lID, at 13-14 [hereinafter referred to as Final Record]. 
14. See text in connection with notes 65-67 infra. 
15. Regulations attached to Hague Conventions No. IV of1907 Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 100 Brit. For. & State Papers 338. 
16. 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick of Armies 
in the Field, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847, 118 L.N.T.S. 303. 
17. 1 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its Activities during the Second World 
War 412 (1948) [hereinafter referred to as ICRC Report]. To the same effect see Trainin, Hiderite 
Responsibility under Criminal Law 40 (1945). 
18. ICRC Report 404-436. 
19. Dallin, German Rule in Russia 420 (1957). A rumor to this general effect caused the GermanEmbassy 
in Ankara, where the negotiations were being carried on, to raise the question with the ICRC delegate. ICRC 
Report 415. Many persons continue to believe that most of the Soviet soldiers who were repatriated to Russia 
from prisoner-of-war camps at the end of World War II were either executed or were sent to Siberia and that 
the knowledge of the fate which awaited them was the cause of the wave of suicides which occurred in the 
camps after the fall of Germany. Some sought and obtained asylum in Switzerland. Castren, The Present Law 
of War and Neutrality 165 (1954). 
20. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et Ie Conflit de Coree: Recueil de Documents 16 (1952). 
21. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front 141, 145 (1966); Vatcher, Panmunjom 116 (1958). 
22. British Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea 3-34 (1955); Vatcher, 
Panmunjom, photograph opposite 114 (1958),Joyce, Red Cross International 200-201 (1959). 
23. See text in connection with notes 8 and 9 supra. 
24. Although not engaged in armed conflict with a Comnmnist opponent, the French indirecdy followed 
this course of action during the civil war in Algeria with the result that the Provisional Government of the 
Algerian Republic, the political arm of the rebellion, not only committed itself to apply the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, but considered it appropriate to actively seek French compliance. Algerian Office, White Paper 
on the Application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in the Franco-Algerian Conflict (1960). The White 
Paper cites (at 13) a newspaper article by Professor Roger Pinto, of the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Paris, giving as one reason for the French reluctance to apply the Conventions "the absence of reciprocity in 
respect to the humanitarian rules." 
25. This argument is particularly applicable to Article 3 dealing with armed conflict not of an international 
character, note 34 infra, inasmuch as a proposed provision requiring reciprocity, which had been included in 
the working draft, was intentionally deleted by the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. Castren, Civil War 86 (1966); 
Coursier, L'Evolution du Droit International Humain, 99 Hague Recueil des Cours 357,395 (1960); Pinto, 
Les Rcgles du Droit International Concernant la Guerre Civile, 114 Hague Recueil des Cours 451, 530 
(1965). 
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26. Under the third paragraph of Article 2, parties to the Convention are not bound with respect to 
another party to the conflict which is not a party to the Convention unless "the latter accepts and applies the 
provisions thereof." Under these circumstances it is somewhat difficult to accept the contention that a party 
to the Convention is absolutely bound when the other party to the conflict is a party to the Convention, even 
though the other party patently flaunts it and does not even purport to apply its provisions. Such a construction 
merely encourages adherences by states which have no intention of ever complying with the Convention. Is 
this, perhaps, what has occurred? 
At the Hearings held to determine whether the Senate should give its advice and consent to the ratification 
of the 1949 Conventions by the President, the then General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Wilbur 
M. Brucker, testified: "Should war come and our enemy should not comply with the conventions, once we 
both had ratified-what then would be our course of conduct? The answer to this is that to a considerable 
extent the United States would probably go on acting as it had before, for, as I pointed out earlier, the treaties 
are very largely a restatement of how we act in war anyway. 
"If our enemy showed by the most flagrant and general disregard for the treaties, that it had in fact thrown 
off their restraints altogether, it would then rest with us to reconsider what our position might be." Hearings 
on the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at 11 (1955). 
27. Meeker, The Legaliry of U.S. Participation in the Defense ofViet-Nam, 54 Dep't State Bull. 474, 
477 (1966). In a speech delivered to the Foreign Policy Association on Nov. 14, 1967, Secretary of State Rusk 
ridiculed those who take the position that the fighting in Vietnam is '1ust a civil war." 57 Dep't State Bull. 
735, 740 (1967). Of course, his argument was based largely upon the ground that North Vietnamese Army 
units had been committed to the fighting in South Vietnam; while those who argue that it is a civil war draw 
the opposite conclusion from this same fact! Secretary Rusk does strengthen his argument by pointing to the 
post-World War II problem of the bifurcated States which appear in each instance to have become two separate 
sovereignties: Germany, Korea, and Vietnam. 
28. Moore, Underwood & McDougal, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic of 
Vietnam 32 (unpublished ms., Yale Law School, May 1966); Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assistance 
to the Republic of Vietnam, 61 Am]. Intl L. 1,2 (1967);]ohnson, Aquinas, Grotius and the Vietnam War, 
16 Quis Custodiet? 69, 67, 70 (1967); Kutner, "International" Due Process for Prisoners of War, 21 U. Miami 
L. Rev. 721, 730 (1967). Many of those who support the official position do not find it necessary to reach 
the question of the nature of the conflict. Deutsch, The Legaliry of the United States Position in Vietnam, 52 
A.B.AJ. 436 (1966). In Partan, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Conflict, 46 B.U.L. Rev. 281, 299 (1966), the 
author discusses the problem but reaches no conclusion. See also, the ICRC letter, notes 3 and 5 supra. 
29. Fried (ed.), Vietnam and International Law 63 (1967); Falk, International Law and the United States 
Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 Yale LJ. 1122, 1127 and passim (1966); Standard, United States Intervention 
in Vietnam is not Legal, 52 A.B.AJ. 627, 630 (1966); Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 
Am.]. Int'l L. 750, 756 (1966). Standard appears to argue from a conclusion already reached when, after 
pointing out the State Department position, he says: "It is hardly open to dispute that the present conflict in 
South Vietnam is essentially a civil war." Certainly, Messrs. Rusk and Meeker (the latter the Legal Adviser of 
the Department of State) would dispute it! And Kutner, supra note 28, just as easily reaches the opposite 
conclusion, stating: "Considering Communism's commitment to the success of all wars of 'national hoeration' 
and the participation of United States military on a large, escalating scale, it would be unrealistic to consider 
the conflict as purely domestic." The dispute on this question clearly indicates the correctness of the statements 
that "the dividing line between international and internal war is often exceedingly tenuous" (Greenspan, 
International Law and its Protection for Participants in Unconventional Warfare, 341 Annals 30, 31 (1962» 
and that "all international war is, to some extent, civil war, and all civil war, international war." Pinto, supra 
note 25, at 455 (translation mine). 
30. See Stone, Legal Controls ofInternationai Conflict 313 n.85 (Rev. ed. 1959), where the following 
appears: " ••• Art. 2, para. 1, of the revised Prisoners of War Convention, 1949, declaring its provisions 
applicable not only to declared war but also to 'any armed conflict ... even if a state of war is not recognized' 
by a belligerent Contracting Party, is a welcome recognition of the need to place the point beyond doubt." 
And in Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 22-23 
(1960) [hereinafter referred to as Commentary], it is stated: "By its general character, this paragraph deprives 
belligerents, in advance, of the pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their obligations. There 
is no need for a formal declaration of war, or for the recognition of the existence of a state of war, as preliminaries 
to the application of the Convention. The occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient. 
" •.• Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed 
forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of 
a state of war." And, finally, in Institute of Law, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, International Law 420 
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(ca. 1960) [hereinafter referred to as Soviet International Law], this statement is made: "The absence ofa formal 
declaration of war does not deprive hostilities which have in fact begun, of the character of war from the point 
of view of the need to observe its laws and customs. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 require that their 
signatories apply these Conventions, which are a component part of the laws and customs of war, in the event 
of a declaration of war or in any armed conflict, even if one of the parties to the conflict does not recognize 
the existence of a state of war." 
31. A news article from Cairo which appeared in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1966 at 12, col. 3, stated: 
"The sources quoted the [North Vietnamese] Ambassador as having rejected the American contention that 
United States airmen captured in attacks on North Vietnam should be treated as prisoners of war under the 
terms of the Geneva conventions. 
He was reported to have told influential Egyptians that this was impossible "because this is a case where 
no war has been declared" by either country. 
32. It will have been noted that the Convention provision quoted in the text states that the Convention 
is applicable in an armed conflict between two or more High Contracting Parties even if a state of war is not 
recognized by one of them. In Vietnam a state of war, in the legal sense, is not recognized by allY of the parties 
involved. 52 Dep't State Bull. 403 (1965). Does this remove the armed conflict in Vietnam from the reach of 
Article 2? To answer this question in the affirmative would seem to be directly contrary to the intent of the 
Article and to the object and purpose of the Convention. The ICRC states that it does not avoid Article 2. 
Pictet, supra note 30, at 23. Lauterpacht believed that it was the intention of the draftsmen to make the 
Convention applicable even if a state of war was not recognized by "one or both of them." 2 Lauterpacht's 
Oppenheim, International Law 369 n.6 (7th ed. 1952). 
33. One of the major purposes of the provision was to preclude a State from indulging in the excuses 
put forward by Japan during the China Incident and by Nazi Germany during World War II as a basis for not 
applying earlier humanitarian conventions: that there had been no declaration of war, that legally a state of 
war did not exist, that the existence of a state of war was not recognized, that the armed conflict was only a 
"police action," etc. See theJudgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1008-09 (mimeo. 
1949) [hereinafter referred to as IMTFEJudgment], Latyshev; The 1949 Geneva Conventions Concerning 
the Protection of Victims of War, 7 The Soviet State and Law 121 (1954) (original in Russian). 
34. Article 3 states: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one 
of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded 
on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever 
with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may 
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict. 
35. Statement of Mr. Morosov (USSR), Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. lID, at 325-26; Pictet, 
Commentary, supra note 30, at 34. 
36. Pictet, The XXth International Conference of the Red Cross: Results in the Legal Field, 7 J. Int'l 
Comm'nJurists 3, 15 (1966). 
37. "[FJuture generations may consider it a sad commentary on our times that the nations of the world 
thought it necessary in these conventions to provide that in case of an internal conflict, murder, mutilation, 
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torture and other cruel treatment should not be practiced on prisoners and other noncombatants .... " Yingling 
& Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of1949 in 46 Am.]. Int'l L. 393, 396 (1952). 
38. Greenspan, supra note 29, at 40; Note, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Application in the 
Vietnamese Conflict,S Va.]. Int'l L. 243, 249 (1965). 
39. Pictet, supra note 36; de la Pradelle, Le Contrale de L'Application des Conventions Humanitaires 
en cas de Conflit Arme, 2 Annuaire Fran~ais de Droit International 343, 364 (1956). 
40. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 3D, at 28-34. 
41. Id. at 32. During the debate General Slavin (USSR) made the following statement: "fTlhe United 
Kingdom Delegation had alluded to the fact that colonial and civil wars were not regulated by international 
law, and therefore that decisions in this respect would be out of place in the text of the Conventions. This 
theory was not convincing, since though the jurists themselves were divided in opinion on this point, some 
were of the view that civil war was regulated by international law. Since the creation of the Organization of 
the United Nations this question seemed settled. Article 2 of the Charter provided that Member States must 
ensure peace and world security .... Colonial and civil wars therefore come within the purview ofinternational 
law." Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. Iill, at 14. 
42. The Stockholm (working) draft would have made the entire Convention applicable. Id., Vol. I, at 
73. The provisions of the draft article proposed by the USSR would have obligated each party to an armed 
conflict not of an international character to implement all of the provisions of the Convention which guarantee 
"humane treatment of prisoners of war" and "the application of all established rules for the treatment of 
prisoners of war." Id., Vol. III, Annex 15, at 28. 
43. In construing the provision which was adopted, Pictet, Commentary, supra note 3D, at 42, states: 
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character ... the Parties to the conflict are legally only 
bound to observe Article 3, and may ignore all the other Articles .... " 
44. Id. at 37; Note, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Application in the Vietnamese Conflict,S Va. 
]. Int'l L. 243, 248 (1965). 
45. Pinto, supra note 25, at 529. Pinto says: "When the parties to the civil war receive foreign assistance, 
the assisting States have a strict obligation to comply with and to require compliance with Article 3 .... Thus 
the United States and the Democratic RepUblic of Vietnam are equally responsible for the application of 
Article 3 in the civil war on the tetritory of South Vietnam." (Translation mine). 
46. Of course, established governments have not infrequendy failed to comply with their obligations 
under Article 3-but this was not necessarily because they considered Article 3 invalid per se. See note 24 
supra. As a matter of fact, when the French finally agreed to permit the ICRC to function in Algeria, it was 
specifically stated that this action was taken "in accordance with Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions." 
LeClercq, L'Application du Statut du Prisonnier de Guerre depuis la Convention de Geneve de 1949, in 43 
Revue de Droit International et de Droit Compare 35,45 (1966). 
47. In Yingling & Ginnane, supra note 37, at 396, the authors, both lawyer-members of the United 
States delegation to the 1949 Diplomatic Conventions, said: "Insofar as Article 3 purports to bind the insurgent 
party to the conflict to apply its provisions, its legal efficacy may be doubted." 
48. See te,,:t in connection with note 9 supra. 
49. For a discussion of the several theories which have been advanced for holding a rebel organization 
bound by the provisions of Article 3, even though it had never itself agreed to be bound, see Note, The 
Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 851,856-58 (1967). 
See also Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 206, 213 (1953), 
where that noted authority said: "The effect of these provisions [relating to armed conflict not of an 
international character) is to subject the parties to a civil war--including the party which is not a recognised 
belligerent-to important restraints of the law of war ... " 
50. The correct jargon, of course, would be "national liberation movements." 
51. Soviet International Law, supra note 3D, at 410; and see the further quotation from this textbook in 
note 69 infra. 
52. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 3D, at 38 (emphasis in original). He also states: "What Government 
would dare to claim before the world ••• that, Article 3 not being applicable, it was entided to leave the 
wounded uncared for, to torture and mutilate prisoners and take hostages? No Government can object to 
observing, in its dealings with enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict between it and them, a few essential 
rules which it in fact observes daily, under its own laws, when dealing with common criminals." Id. at 36-37. 
Unfortunately, experience shows that some governments do just what is described, but without any such bald 
admission 
53. Several years ago the suggestion was made that in any armed conflict in which United Nations forces 
were involved, they should not be bound by the law of war, but their opponent should be. The reaction to 
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this proposal was violent and caustic, and properly so. See Bothe, Le Droit de la Guerre et les Nations Unies 
(1967). 
54. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 37-38. Of course, if they are mere brigands, they are not 
entitled to the protection of the Convention. 
55. It is essential to bear in mind that the last paragraph of Article 3 specifies that the fact that a party 
complies with the provisions of the Article "shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This 
provision was obviously included in order to permit the established government to comply with Article 3 
without recognizing the existence of a state of belligerency with the insurgents. Paradoxically, in Algeria it 
was the insurgents themselves who called attention to this provision of the Article. Algerian Office White 
Paper, supra note 24, at 17-18. 
56. See note 25 supra; Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 35, Draper, The Geneva Conventions of 
1949 at 114 Hague Recueil des Cours 59, 96 (1965). 
57. See note 15 supra. 
58. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 83 (1947). 
59. rd. at 61-62. In speaking of Nazi violations of the law of war, the IMT said (at 57): "Prisoners of 
war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered, not only in defiance of the well-established rules of 
international law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of humanity ••.. " 
60. United States v. von Leeb et aI., 10 Trials ofWar Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals 
1 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Trials]. This opinion carries over into Vol. 11 of the series. 
61. 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 
846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343. 
62. United States v. von Leeb et aI., 10 Trials 1 at 11 Trials 532-34 (1948). 
63. Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 80 Harv. L. 
Rev. 851, 858 (1967). A well known French ell.1'ert in this field has said: "These obligations [enumerated in 
Article 3] correspond to those which the domestic public law of civilized States recognizes, even in cases of 
insurrection, riot or civil war .... The summary execution of prisoners is prohibited." Pinto, supra note 25, 
at 532 (translation mine). 
64. United States v. von Leeb et aI., 10 Trials 1 at 11 Trials 535-38. But see Draper, supra note 56, at 
90, where he states: "Undoubtedly, the prohibition of murder, mutilation or torture is absorbed in the 
customary prohibitions of the law of war. On the other hand the taking of hostages, outrages upon personal 
dignity, the passing of sentences by irregular tribunals, unfairly conducted, are not yet prohibited by the 
customary law of war .... " 
65. See note 34 supra. 
66. See text in connection with notes 42 and 43 supra. 
67. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 39 and 141; Smith, The Geneva Prisoner ofWar Convention: 
An Appraisal, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 880, 889 (1967); Pinto, supra note 63. 
68. See text in connection with notes 156-163 infra. 
69. Soviet International Law, supra note 30, at 423. Elsewhere (at 407) the statement is made that "the 
laws and customs of war must be observed in any armed conflict." 
70. It is not unusual to find, after hostilities have ended, that many incidents (or at least many of the 
more gory details thereof) which have been reported during the course of hostilities, were basically figments 
of the imagination: perhaps a minor incident which has been built up out of all proportion to the actual facts 
by the addition of horrendous details, perhaps an entirely imaginary incident conceived by a public relations 
officer or a reporter when headline news was lacking. However, the major violations to be discussed herein 
are in the nature of admissions against interest: actions constituting, or allegedly constituting, violations by the 
United States and the South Vietnamese, reported by the American news media, and actions constituting, or 
allegedly constituting, violations by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, reported by Radio Hanoi and 
the Liberation Radio, or by other sources in Hanoi. (As the alleged violation mentioned in note 9 supra does 
not meet this criterion, it will not be discussed. It is, however, one of the most heinous violations not only of 
the Convention, but also of the customary law of war). 
71. See text in connection with note 6 supra. 
72. Joint Communique of the Honolulu Conference, Feb. 8, 1966, at 54 Dep't State Bull. 304, 305 
(1966), Joint Communique of the Manila Summit Conference, Oct. 25,1966, at 55 Dep't State Bull. 730, 
731 (1966), Text of Communique of the Washington Meeting, April 21, 1967, at 56 Dep't State Bull. 747, 
749 (1967). The nations involved in the latter two meetings were Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, and the United States. 
73. That incidents of maltreatment of prisoners of war by American personnel have occurred is beyond 
dispute. There will never be a war fought in which there are not, at the very least, isolated instances of 
maltreatment of prisoners of war on both sides. The general moral environment in which the individual soldiers 
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have been raised may be judged, and the training which they have received while in military service may be 
measured, by the frequency with which such incidents occur. While Clergy and Laymen Concerned About 
Vietnam in their book, In the Name of America (issued in February, 1968 afier this article had been substantially 
completed), allocates a chapter of 45 pages to the reprinting of published items about the maltreatment of 
prisoners of war, there is only an occasional, and frequendy misleading, indication (usually based on hearsay) 
of such misconduct by American troops. The weakness of the "evidence" quoted to support the organization's 
thesis of misconduct is, in itself, extremely persuasive of the inaccuracy of the conclusion reached by one of 
the commentators (at 23) that "these combat practices are so \videspread in their occurrence as to suggest that 
their systematic commission is a direct result of decisions rcached at the highest levels of civilian and military 
command." When Ambassador Harriman sent the ICRC a Department of Defense report on the methods 
used by the several military services of the United States to disseminate information concerning the 
requirements of the Conventions, the ICRC President replied: "We are convinced that in the context of the 
war in Vietnam the U.S. Forces are devoting a major effort to the spread of knowledge on the Geneva 
Conventions." Letter from Samuel A. Gonard to W. Averell Harriman, January 5, 1968, on file in the 
Department of State. 
74. A series of photographs and extracts from news stories recording maltreatment of prisoners of war 
by the South Vietnamese which had appeared in a number of respected American publications were collected 
and published in a brochure entided What are we tied to in Vietnam? by Massachusetts Political Action for 
Peace, Cambridge, Mass. (1964). 
75. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 22,1965, at 3B; id. Nov. 3, 1965, at 2A; id. April 27, 1966, at 2A; id. 
Feb. 9, 1968, at lB. 
76. Id. Dec. 30, 1965, at lA. Photographs indicating kind and generous treatment by American personnel 
have also appeared (id. Mar. 5, 1966, at 2A, Mar. 6,1966 at 12A), but these are suspect as thcy are self-serving 
and could easily have been posed for an enterprising photographer. 
77. The brochure referred to in note 74 supra is a good example of this reaction. 
78. A letter to the editor of the N.Y. Times from the Chairman of the University Committee on 
Problems of War and Peace at the University of Pennsylvania said: "Responsible Americanjournalists have 
frequendy reported the torture of Vietcong prisoners by their South Vietnamese captors. Because of these 
repotts W. W. Rostow, chairman of the foreign policy research division of our State Department, was asked 
••• 'why does the United States not abide by the Red Cross Convention in the treatment of Vietcong 
prisoners?' His reply was that the United States does not take prisoners in Vietnam, and that we were merely 
advisers to the South Vietnamese Government, which bore the responsibility for dealing with prisoners. 
Because of this immoral apathy, and narrow legalistic position taken by our State Department, neither the 
United States nor the South Vietnamese, nor the Vietcong, nor the North Vietnamese are committed to 
adhere to any of the 'sanctions established by international law for the protection of war prisoners.''' N.Y. 
Times,June 30, 1965, at 36, col. 5. The writer of the letter erred in both his assumptions and his conclusions, 
but he certainly raised the moral issue. 
79. This problem did arise in one context at the Diplomatic Conference-in connection with Article 
12, which concerns custody of prisoners of war transferred from one ally to another. Under Article 12 the 
transferring state retains some residual power with respect to prisoners of war it transfers, because it can request 
return of the prisoners to its custody where the transferee state is guilty of violating the Convention in their 
regard. Article 12 requires that this procedure be followed where the Protecting Power finds violations of the 
Convention and the Detaining Power does not correct them. The Communist countries have all reserved as 
to this Article, insisting that the capturing power remain fully responsible for any maltreatment suffered by 
prisoners of war at the hands of the transferee Detaining Power. See, for example, the USSR reservation made 
at the time of signing (75 U.N.T.S. 135,460) and maintained at the time of ratification (191 U N.T S. 367). 
80. "The major United States effort, besides setting up its own procedures, has been to persuade the 
South Vietnamese to go along. [South Vietnamese] Government officials, once openly hostile to the 
convention, now grudgingly accept the American position. Much remains to be done, however, to persuade 
the average South Vietnamese soldier to stop using torture. Each soldier will soon be shown a training film 
prepared with American help. Most have already received booklets outlining the proper treatment of 
prisoners." N.Y. Times,July 1, 1966, at 6, col. 3. See also Pinto supra note 45. 
81. "United States offiicials are quiedy putting into effect an important change in their handling of 
prisoners of war. Vietcong and North Vietnamese fighters captured on the batdefield will no longer be turned 
over to the South Vietnamese Army immediately afier the fighting has died down. Instead, they will be sent 
to American divisional headquarters and kept in American hand [sic] until they can be transferred to new 
Vietnamese prisoner-of-war compounds .•.. The system has been adopted to enable the United States to 
meet its responsibilities under Article 12 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 governing the treatment of 
prisoners of war. The article requires the country turning prisoners over to another country to guarantee their 
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